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Institutional Care for the Mentally Defective, 1914–
1948: Diversity as a Response to Individual Needs
and an Indication of Lack of Policy Coherence
GRAHAM CHESTER and PAMELA DALE*
In recent years mental deficiency policy and the wider issue of the history ofpeople with
learning difficulties have attracted much attention. Important publications by Mathew
Thomson, Anne Digby, MarkJackson, David Wright and others have led to a reassessment
of mental deficiency provision.
1 These scholars have firmly placed mental deficiency
serviceswithin a mixedeconomy ofcare,with statutory and voluntary sector organizations
providing institutional and community-based services in cooperation, and also in competi-
tion, with one another. The politics of service-delivery provided an important strand of
analysis in Thomson’s The problem of mental deficiency, but he did not seek to investigate
any one institution, preferring instead to concentrate on the wider debates that informed
service-development.
2This enabled him to link changes in the sector to much wider social,
economic, political and intellectual trends in ways that have stimulated a great deal of
interest and research. To date most attention has concentrated on case studies of specialist
institutions before 1914 and the development of community care in the twentieth century.
This leaves something of a gap in the literature because institutions (created before and
after 1914) are relatively neglected in studies of the implementation of the 1913 and 1927
Mental Deficiency Acts. The place of such institutions within the mixed economy of care
therefore remains uncertain.
This paperplacesinstitutionsatthecore ofprovisionafter1914andsuggestsdiversityin
schemes of institutional and community care as a new way of understanding the relation-
ship between the two. Within the mixed economy of care there were groups identifiable as
‘‘purchasers’’and‘‘providers’’ofcare,ifweborrow twenty-first-centuryterminology. The
key purchasers of care were the local authorities with statutory responsibilities for mental
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59deficiency work. Identifying the providers of care is more difficult, because they
were more numerous and subject to change over time. The 1913 Mental Deficiency
Act (MDA) recognized that a number of specialist facilities as well as general institutions
(includingprisonsand workhouses)already provided accommodation forpeople classified
as ‘‘defectives’’ within the meaning of the act. For commentators like David Garland,
3 this
firmly locates mental deficiency services within an increasingly elaborate penal-welfare
system. Yet, in the Edwardian period, institutional care for the mentally defective was
advocated by individuals concerned to improve the care of, as well as control over, people
who later became subject to the provisions of the MDA. This meant that the broad
ideological consensus, which is apparent from Thomson’s work, was able to support
the MDA, despite continuing debate about the most appropriate balance of care and
control.
4
Campaigners who supported the legislation were, however, concerned that the accom-
modationprovidedbeforetheMDAwasinadequate.Ononelevelitwasinsufficientforthe
numberof‘‘defectives’’they expectedtoidentify andbringunder thecontroloftheact,but
there was also concern that the care regimes offered by many of these pre-existing institu-
tions were inappropriate. This led to attempts to curtail the use of unsuitable general
institutions (especially prisons and workhouses), adapt the regimes of existing specialist
institutions to bring them into conformity with the new agenda for care heralded by the
1913 act, and create new institutions (controlled by local authorities and run on ‘‘colony’’
lines) to enable the full implementation of the legislation.
Supportersofthe 1913 MDAtended toviewmental deficiency asa nationalproblem but
theimplementationofthislegislationwasataskforlocalgovernment,overseen byanewly
created Board of Control. Different local authorities responded in a variety of ways, their
actions often being conditional on a range of factors that to date have been unexplored
beyond general statements about unequal amounts of financial resources and political will.
This paper considers the three different schemes for mental deficiency work developed by
the Somerset, Devon, and Dorset county councils. These three local authorities have been
chosen because they shared a partnership agreement with the managing committee of the
RoyalWesternCountiesInstitution(RWCI)atStarcrossinDevon(aformervoluntaryidiot
asylum established in the 1860s and a major provider of institutional accommodation after
1914). They also shared a good deal of data with each other and often conducted joint
negotiations with the Board of Control. All three made repeated commitments to devel-
oping a comprehensive mental deficiency service, and expressed continuing support for
institutional segregation.
These important similarities did not, however, result in a common strategy for mental
deficiency work. A combination of local preferences and local circumstances dictated
different approaches to the problem of creating a mental deficiency service. It will be
shownthat Somersetbenefitedtoanunusualextent fromavery activevoluntarysector that
had been interested in the problem for many years before 1914 (and this included links to
the voluntary asylum at Starcross). Somerset pioneered a scheme based on a cluster of
3DavidGarland,Punishmentandwelfare:ahistory
of penal strategies, Aldershot, Gower, 1985.
4Thomson, op. cit., note 1 above, introduction.
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Graham Chester and Pamela Daleinstitutions closely integrated with each other and community-based services. Devon and
Dorset had fewer resources to draw on but at an early stage adopted two different
approaches. The statutory authority in Devon was determined to be a provider of institu-
tional care as well as a purchaser of services. The goal of a county asylum dominated long-
term planning in Devon, although in the short term the county council acceded to Board of
ControlrequeststoworkincooperationwiththeRWCI.Dorsetwasequallydeterminednot
to become a direct provider of mental deficiency services and instead supported eugenic
policies to limit future numbers while utilizing workhouse beds and specialist out-of-
county placements. In a limited way this included the RWCI.
Institutional care (though not necessarily the RWCI) was at the heart of all these local
authority schemes for mental deficiency work. Beds in institutions were, however, rela-
tively scarce and expensive because the development of new institutions was severely
hampered by financial and organizational difficulties. Elsewhere Pamela Dale has argued
that the slow development of new institutions had a long-term impact on the development
of both institutional and community care.
5 This occurred not least because pre-existing
institutions exerted a strong influence over service development that had not been antici-
pated by campaigners who had pressed for the legislation. The cost and shortage of beds
also arguably led to a situation where community care was developed as an adjunct, rather
than real alternative, to institutional care.
Institutions were vital to the implementation of the Mental Deficiency Acts. They
provided a distinct locus of care and supported arrangements for extra-institutional
care. Mark Jackson and others have gone further by arguing that institutions operated
as a site where the meanings of normality and deficiency were constructed.
6 This is
undoubtedly true, although it could be argued that the diversity of institutional provision
discussed in this paper allowed the construction of alternative and competing definitions.
This led to a situation where diversity in provision was both a response to individual needs
and an indication of lack of policy coherence.
A Preference for Institutional Care?
In Somerset, Mrs Norah Cooke-Hurle (ne ´e Fry),
7 the long-serving chair of the statutory
mental deficiency committee and a key member of the Somerset Association for Mental
Welfare (SAMW), provided a vital link between the statutory and voluntary sectors. She
used her powerful position within the local authority to secure the cooperation of other
councillors, and officers, while deploying the resources of the voluntary sector to good
effect. Voluntary organizations with an interest in mental deficiency work had existed in
Somerset for many years before the MDA but after 1914 the most important was the newly
formed Somerset Association for the Care of the Mentally Defective, renamed the SAMW
5Pamela Dale, ‘Implementing the 1913 Mental
Deficiency Act: competing priorities and resource
constraint evident in the South West of England before
1948’, Soc. Hist. Med., 2003, 16: 403–18.
6Jackson, op. cit., note 1 above.
7We are indebted to Oliver Russell, the former
Honorary Director of the Norah Fry Research Centre:
Research on Services for People with Learning
Difficulties at the University of Bristol, for facilitating
accesstohispersonalcollectionofpapersrelatingtothe
life of Norah Fry (1871–1960). These included a copy
of the obituary written by Sir Philip Morris that
appeared in The Times, 17 June 1960, p. 19.
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Institutional Care for the Mentally Defective, 1914–1948in 1921. This organization raised funds from wealthy supporters to acquire mental defi-
ciency institutions,whichwere latertakenover bySomersetCountyCouncil.
8Inthe1920s
and 1930s Somerset County Council operated four institutions. Yatton Hall (for severely
disabled children) and Sandhill Park (for trainable children) had been established by the
voluntary sector, with generous patrons encouraging more ambitious schemes than might
otherwise have been contemplated by the statutory authority. The other two institutions,
known as Cambridge House and West End House, were parts of the Long Ashton and
Shepton Mallet workhouses. This accommodation had been certified for mental deficiency
cases by the Board of Control in 1917 and 1919. These two workhouses were finally
appropriated by the county council after the 1929 Local Government Act, but local interest
in dedicated institutional provision for the mentally defective meant that these institutions
had already provided specialist beds for almost thirty years.
9
After 1914 Mrs Cooke-Hurle was able to coordinate mental deficiency services, pre-
viously developed by the voluntary sector and Boards of Guardians, through her extensive
personal contacts and political connections. She also managed to work in cooperation with
a number of the council’s own departments without having to concede leadership of the
service to interested professionals. The Somerset Medical Officer of Health was rarely
prominent in debates about mental deficiency; rather Mrs Cooke-Hurle developed a num-
ber of local, regional and national platforms to disseminate her views on the subject.
10 She
supported the idea that different services might meet different needs and endorsed lay
education and training programmes within the context of a Board of Control approved
medical model of care.
11
Mrs Cooke-Hurle drew on a local model of care that predated the 1913 MDA and it was
this comprehensive network of pre-existing services that was expanded and developed
after 1914. The Board of Control praised Somerset as a good provider of institutional care,
and the high rate of ascertainment (the process of identifying and bringing ‘‘defectives’’
under the control of the MDAs) suggests community services were also well developed.
Jan Walmsley and her colleagues strongly suggest that it was this early provision that later
encouraged Somerset to develop measures that characterized it as an ‘‘interventionist local
authority’’.
12 After 1914, and more significantly after the disruptions associated with the
First World War, the numbers of people assessed as potential ‘‘defectives’’ and made
subject to the provisions of the 1913 MDA certainly increased. These certified mental
8The evolution of statutory and voluntary services
in Somerset is summarized by Eric Rose, Services for
people with a mental handicap: a brief history of the
developmentofhospitalcareinthecountyofSomerset,
Taunton, Somerset County Council Social Services
Department, 1989.
9Ibid., pp. 9–10.
10TheroleoftheCountyMedicalOfficerofHealth
has attracted far less interest and research than his
municipal medical colleagues, although it might be
anticipated that the greater geographical area served
necessitated less personal involvement with particular
problems and schemes to alleviate them. Professional
and personal interests may have been important, as the
Devon Medical Officer of Health took a leading role in
mental deficiency work.
11Mrs Cooke-Hurle was closely associated with
both institutional and community services, such as the
occupationcentres,initiatedbytheSAMW,andalsosat
as the Somerset County Council representative on the
managing committee of the RWCI. She supported the
appointment of a resident medical officer at the RWCI
and widely canvassed support for her preferred
candidate. Exeter UniversityLibraryRWCI Collection
(hereafter RWCI Collection), Joint Committee of
RWCI, special sub-committee, 18 Jan. 1938,
minute 28.
12Jan Walmsley, Dorothy Atkinson, and Sheena
Rolph,‘Communitycareandmentaldeficiency1913to
1945’, in Bartlett and Wright (eds), op. cit., note 1
above, pp. 181–203, p. 189.
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Graham Chester and Pamela Daledeficiency cases were eligible for admission to institutions or a variety of community-
based care services. In Somerset, beds in institutions remained scarce and expensive, but it
isarguable thatinstitutional care remainedcentral tothe council’smentaldeficiency plans.
Throughout the period the local authority funded the expansion of existing and new
institutions. It also appears that new services based in the community were designed to
support the work of these institutions.
The important point is made by Walmsley and her colleagues that in Somerset com-
munity care operated ‘‘alongside institutional care, not in opposition to it’’, but arguably
more emphasis needs to be placed on the centrality of institutional care within a model of
service delivery that had institutional and community care elements.
13 Community care
was framed by the need to monitor and support individuals and families while an assess-
ment for institutional care was made. It was also designed to provide services for indi-
viduals waiting for institutional care, people not in immediate need of institutional care,
and those patients normally resident in institutions but temporarily at home on holiday or
extended licence. These groups included people who would never actually be admitted to
institutions but whose continuing care was assessed on the basis that they might need to be
institutionalized at some point in the future.
In contrast to today, institutional care was often the preferred solution rather than
the destination of last resort, and there is little evidence to suggest that the
expansion of community services challenged these attitudes within the statutory authority.
Instead community care was often about expanding the reach of the institution into
the community. It is also possible that the expansion of community services was
viewed as a temporary measure pending the completion of planned but undelivered insti-
tutional schemes. For example, developments at the RWCI were intended to create
more than 200 Somerset beds in the first phase alone. Preliminary works started
in 1929 but construction was delayed until the eve of the Second World War and
then the new facilities were allocated to evacuees.
14 The council experienced similar
problems with its own Sandhill Park Colony, even before the army requisitioned it
in 1940.
15
With institutions, in theory ifnot in practice, dominating local provision, the community
care offered had a strong element of community surveillance as well as service delivery.
The behaviour of individuals and the quality of home care provided by their relatives was
closely scrutinized. These surveillance activities were not incompatible with support for
parents, but whether care or control were the dominant themes of the work the result was
much the same. People were institutionalized to reduce the burden of care on respectable
families, to receive better care/treatment than they could at home, and to punish disre-
putable and/or uncooperative families. Thus the application for institutional care for
‘‘Donald’’ noted that continuing home care presented a risk to the development of his
siblings and suggested, ‘‘the mother’s health will suffer if she has to look after him much
13Ibid., p. 196.
14RWCI Collection, Joint Committee of RWCI,
special sub-committee, 27 July 1940, discussed and
declined proposals to create an army psycho-neurotic
unitattheLangdonColony.Insteaditagreedtotakeup
to 200 cases evacuated from Sandhill Park. These were
Somerset cases, but they were not the patients the beds
had been intended for.
15The military use of this facility is briefly
described in Edgar Jones, ‘War and the practice of
psychotherapy: the UK experience 1939–1960’, Med.
Hist., 2004, 48: 493–510, pp. 495–6.
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16 Mr C, whose home circumstances were described as ‘‘particularly good’’, also
requested an institutional place for his son on the grounds that ‘‘my son’s mental condition
will not improve without the special training I am unable to give him’’.
17 The home report
on ‘‘Betty’’ was regarded as ‘‘unsatisfactory’’ and an institutional place was sought. No
mention was madeof the parents’views and itis possible they were disregarded becauseof
the allegation that ‘‘the child is very dirty and neglected’’.
18 While all these individuals
appear to have been living at home immediately before the application for institutional
care, no long-term community solution to their problems appears to have been considered.
Hence the permanently long waiting lists and demands for ever-more institutional beds.
While local authorities such as Somerset had developed community services tofacilitate
their ascertainment work, very little thought appears to have been given to aftercare, and
this concentration on pre-admission services was even more noticeable in areas where
extra-institutional services were established at a later date.
19 This further reinforces the
idea that, in theory at least, permanent care was seen as both desirable and possible.
Providers of institutional care, such as the RWCI, argued strongly that this was not the
case, and tried to make future admissions dependent upon other patients leaving the
institution. This was understood by the partner local authorities, but only in the narrow
sense that they could create vacancies for urgent cases by requesting transfers for other
patientsandcouldspecifywhichpatientonthewaitinglistwouldreplaceapatientwhohad
died. Thus Somerset County Council requested that ‘‘the vacancies caused by the death of
these patients can be filled by the admission of Kenneth S ..., and Alice K’’.
20 In other
cases the council clerk proposed elaborate swaps involving transfers not only between
institutions but also between categories of patients to secure urgently needed accommoda-
tion. In one example he argued that ‘‘Barbara’’ had advanced to such an extent at Yatton
Hall (a small home for severely disabled children) that she could be considered ‘‘an
imbecile of higher grade and suitable to mix with lower grade feeble-minded patients’’.
21
If the RWCI would accept her, the urgent cases (that the RWCI would have been deter-
mined to refuse because they were ‘‘low grade’’ and expensive to nurse) would go to
Yatton Hall. The superintendent agreed to this.
22
The interwar period in Somerset witnessed the creation of new institutions, the recon-
figuration of existing ones to make them more suitable for mental deficiency work, and a
commitment to the provision of residential special education followed by institutional
training for children. This was not incompatible with innovations in community care but
the institutions consumed so many resources that community services were in danger of
16RWCI Collection, file marked Somerset Mental
Deficiency Committee, Jan. 1939 to Dec. 1940, letter
from H King (Clerk) and C W Mayer (RWCI
superintendent), 21 Apr. 1939.
17RWCI Collection, file marked Somerset Mental
Deficiency Committee, Jan. 1939 to Dec. 1940,
correspondencebetweenHKingandCWMayer,7Jan.
1939 and 20 Feb. 1939 enclosing letter from Mr C.
18RWCI Collection, file marked Somerset Mental
Deficiency Committee, Jan. 1939 to Dec. 1940, letter
from H King to C W Mayer, 17 Apr. 1939.
19In Devon the RWCI had to make independent
arrangementswiththeDevonequivalentoftheSAMW
to supervise patients temporarily absent from the
institution.
20RWCI Collection, file marked Somerset Mental
Deficiency Committee, Jan. 1939 to Dec. 1940, letter
from H King to C W Mayer, 14 Feb. 1939.
21RWCI Collection, file marked Somerset Mental
Deficiency Committee, Jan. 1939 to Dec. 1940, letter
from H King to C W Mayer, 13 Apr. 1939.
22RWCI Collection, file marked Somerset Mental
Deficiency Committee, Jan. 1939 to Dec. 1940, letter
dated 28 Apr. 1939.
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Graham Chester and Pamela Dalebeingneglectedbythestatutoryauthority.Communitycareserviceswerethereforeheavily
dependent on the voluntarysector forstaff and funds.
23 InJanuary1939, 671 cases thathad
cometothe attentionofthe SAMWwere inspecialistmentaldeficiency institutions,with a
further 95 children in residential schools, and 24 individuals resident in Public Assistance
Institutions; a total of 790. A further 181 patients were on leave from institutions, while 94
individuals were under guardianship, 221 received statutory supervision, and 109 were
supported by public assistance in domiciliary settings. These 605 people were also under
the care/control of the statutory authorities whereas a further 975, including 193 school-
children, were only subject to ‘‘friendly supervision’’ by the voluntary organization.
24
Where community services prospered in Somerset it was usually as an adjunct rather
thananalternative toinstitutionalcare.Evenwhere individualsweresupportedathomefor
long periods, this was often presented in the light of there being no immediate need for
institutional care, rather than the community programme offering a real alternative. It is
noticeable that 30 of the patients technically on leave from institutions were actually
resident in temporary accommodation, and 20 cases were receiving statutory supervision
pending an overdue institutional placement.
25 A voluminous file of correspondence
between Somerset County Council and the RWCI includes many requests for the admis-
sion of patients and their transfer between institutions, but, apart from patients who died,
there are virtually no references to patients leaving care, although some were allowed
periods of licence in the care of relatives and employers. This is not the entire picture,
however. The statutory authority had made clear its own support for a particular model of
institutional care, but the voluntary sector, as providers of institutional and community
care, had some autonomy. Community-based services stressed the legitimacy of commu-
nity care while institutions like the RWCI managed patients according to their own
priorities. Both suggested care over the admission of patients and anticipated discharges
despite the reluctance of the statutory authority.
26
Problems Associated with the Provision of Institutional Care
Somerset was by no means the only local authority to support institutional care for
mental deficiency cases but benefited to an unusual extent from its pre-1914 facilities and
particularly close cooperation with a very active voluntary organization. Other local
authorities, starting almost from scratch, fared poorly in comparison, especially where
they were unable or unwilling to cooperate with other service providers. The RWCI was
situated in Devon but, despite its convenient location, was not central to the county
council’s plans in 1914. This was because the local authority had already tried and failed
23It is worth noting that the correspondence
between Somerset County Council and the RWCI,
referred to earlier in this paper, which endorsed
institutional placements for people previously living
in the community, was dated 1939, when the local
community services were both extensive and
long-established.
24RWCI Collection, file marked Somerset Mental
DeficiencyCommittee,Jan.1939toDec.1940,copyof
25th annual report of the Somerset Association for
Mental Welfare, 1939. Statistical summary produced
by authors from figures given in sections 2–5.
25Ibid.
26The 25th annual report of the Somerset
AssociationforMentalWelfare,section4,mentions15
cases discharged from order by the Board of Control
after two years of continuous licence and 15 similar
cases discharged by different visiting committees and
superintendents. A further 9 cases were transferred to
guardianship schemes.
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Institutional Care for the Mentally Defective, 1914–1948to integrate the asylum into its plans for special education following the 1899 Education
(Defective and Epileptic Children) Act. The statutory authority in Devon was therefore
determinedtopursueplansforacomprehensiveandindependentmentaldeficiencyservice
elsewhere.
27 The decision was reaffirmed on several occasions, especially during a review
of accommodation in 1919/20, despite the fact that Devon lacked the essential infrastruc-
ture that Somerset had developed before and during the First World War.
28 This took time
to establish and, while the 1920s witnessed good progress on increasing ascertainment
rates, in Devon institutional provision failed to keep pace, with significant shortages of
accommodation reported in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s.
29
The statutory authority in Devon was thus left dependent on a number of care providers,
which frustrated plans for a unified service. To secure much-needed beds, the council had
to accept care regimes that did not match their oft-stated aspirations for mental deficiency
work. The council continued torelyheavilyon the beds available at Starcross, butrelations
with the RWCI managing committee were strained by policy differences. The RWCI
continued to discharge patients and refused to support overtly eugenic measures.
Devon County Council and its ‘‘partner’’ institution thus gave conflicting evidence to
the Brock Committee on voluntary sterilization in 1933.
30 The only local alternative to the
RWCI was the use of small homes run by charities. This was costly, hard to supervise, and
in many cases introduced an unwelcome religious dimension to placements. Councillors
and officials tended to be most concerned about cost, but social workers keen to win the
trust of family members had to propose placements that accorded with parents’ religious
beliefs. It was possible to approach distant institutions run by secular public authorities but
negotiating access to beds was a frustrating and time-consuming process that involved
assessments of individual patient needs both before and after specific contractual issues
were resolved. This was also a problem with admissions to the RWCI, and remained
unresolved by successive ‘‘partnership’’ agreements.
31 Local authorities such as Devon
27The development of the RWCI before 1914 is
discussedbyDavidGladstone,‘Thechangingdynamic
of institutional care: the Western Counties Idiot
Asylum, 1864–1914’, in Wright and Digby (eds),
op. cit., note 1 above, pp. 134–60.
28Somersethadexperimentedwithinstitutionaland
community care for the mentally defective at an early
date and these services were viewed as suitable for
purpose after 1913. In fact many facilities remained in
use throughout the inter-war period, and some were
maintained until the final closure programme in the
1980s.
29Devon Record Office (hereafter DRO), 150/5/1/
2. Devon Mental Deficiency Committee (hereafter
Devon MD Com), minutes of meeting with
representatives of the RWCI, 23 Apr. 1936, pp. 1–4.
Statistics shared at this meeting confirmed that Devon
casesoccupied249ofthe730bedsthenavailableatthe
RWCI. This was 99 more than the RWCI was
contracted to provide and the RWCI expected to lose
more than 100 beds as temporary accommodation was
phased out. Thus, while a further 200 beds were
allocated to Devon as part of the Langdon Colony
extension, many of these were replacement beds not
new ones. This did nothing to solve the problem of
accommodating the Devon cases that needed
transferring from Devon Mental Hospital or local Poor
Law Institutions, or a number of children who needed
admitting from poor homes. Devon Medical
Department reported that these cases numbered
at least 326.
30DRO 150/5/1/2, Devon MD Com, 18 May 1933,
minute 767. John P Radford and Allison Tipper,
Starcross: out of the mainstream, Toronto, G Allen
Roeher Institute, 1988, p. 67, summarize the RWCI
position. For full details regarding the Report of the
departmental committee on sterilisation, (Brock
Report), PP Cmnd. 4485, XV, 1934, see Thomson,
op. cit., note 1 above, pp. 193–4, 197–8.
31Many local authorities estimated their likely
patient population and negotiated the admission of a
numberofanonymouspatientsofdifferentgradestothe
RWCI but a patient could only be admitted to graded
accommodation if he or she, personally, presented no
complicating factor. This meant that despite broad
agreement on the nature of cases to be admitted,
a number of other factors were taken into account
when the beds were actually allocated.
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Graham Chester and Pamela Dalethat did not have their own accommodation suffered as mental deficiency services else-
where re-orientated themselves to specific geographical catchment areas, which shrank as
overall demand for accommodation increased.
32
It was not until the 1930s that a new strategy for mental deficiency work emerged in
Devon. This was orchestrated by the County Medical Officer of Health and his department
and was associated with strong support for eugenic segregation and sterilization policies.
33
The 1929 Local Government Act gave the local authority its own accommodation for the
first time.
34 The appropriation of former workhouses for mental deficiency work provided
much-needed beds and this new competition forced concessions from other care providers.
In more confident mood, Devon County Council sought to re-negotiate its partnership with
the RWCI and enforce an agenda for change, with the intention of basing a unified mental
deficiency service on this site and wresting control of the institution from the independent
managing committee.
35 The slow pace of development at Starcross, interrupted first by the
Depression and then the outbreak of war, still left the county reliant on a variety of
institutions, few under its direct control. This was viewed as an unsatisfactory alternative
to one single county asylum.
In Dorset there is no lack of evidence of strong support for eugenically-inspired seg-
regation and sterilization programmes, but there is little sign of enthusiasm for a single
county asylum, such as Devon planned. There was also limited support for a scheme based
on a cluster of institutions closely integrated with each other and community-based ser-
vices, such as Somerset had pioneered. Instead Dorset had a three-pronged strategy:
support for measures to limit future numbers, the use of workhouses for adult patients,
and the development of out-of-county placements for people needing specialist care. In the
short term this was very cost-effective but in the longer term Dorset suffered from the lack
of accommodation under direct local authority control and came under pressure from the
Board of Control to improve its arrangements.
These difficulties may be linked to the sterilization debate. The RWCI superintendent,
CWMayer,wasconcernedthatadvocatesofsterilizationapparentlyregardedthepolicyas
an alternative to segregation and feared that they were postponing investment in institu-
tional care in the forlorn hope that numbers would decline. He used his annual report for
1930/31 to argue strongly that ‘‘it is indisputable that the basis of our present-day pro-
gramme must be institutional’’.
36 To a certain extent the Dorset Mental Deficiency Act
32A number of cases from Devon, Somerset, and
Dorset had been admitted to Metropolitan Asylum
Boardinstitutionsbefore1913andtheBoardofControl
was very keen to secure their removal to local
institutions.
33Devon County Council regularly debated and
endorsedsterilizationschemes.DRO153/5/1/1,Devon
MD Com, 22 Nov.1917, minute 113d. References
become more frequent after 1925. See, for example,
DRO 153/5/1/1, minutes 449 (16 Feb. 1926), 514 (19
May 1927),and522 (8Sept.1927);and DRO,153/5/1/
2,minutes651 (11Sept.1930),724(8Sept.1932),740
(10 Nov. 1932), 751 (9 Feb. 1933), and 767 (18 May
1933).
34Previously the council owned only a small
residential unit for boys.
35ThiswasdonebyplacingDevonCountyCouncil
representatives on the managing committee.DRO 153/
5/1/1, Devon MD Com, 11 May 1920, minute 215,
agreed to nominate one representative from the
education committee and one from the mental
deficiency committee. This later increased to a total of
five after the joint committee structure was adopted in
1937, RWCI Collection, RWCI Joint Committee 30
Nov. 1937, minutes list those present and the
organizations they represented.
36RWCI Collection, box 31, Report of the
superintendenttothepresidentoftheWesternCounties
Institution, Starcross, for the year ending 31st March
1931, p. 1.
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Institutional Care for the Mentally Defective, 1914–1948(MDA) Committee accepted this position although this did not automatically imply sup-
portforthe RWCI.Instead,DorsetCountyCouncilmaintainedpatients inawidevarietyof
institutions scattered over England and Wales. They were very keen to publicize this, and
circulated statistics about these placements. The motivation for doing so appears to have
been to put pressure on service providers to allocate more accommodation to Dorset cases
and reduce the costs of such beds, by reminding them of the competition they faced.
37 Yet,
circulated amongst the Dorset statutory committee members, these lists had different, or at
least supplementary, meanings. Detailed descriptions of the institutions were provided to
show how they were or were not suitable for existing and/or additional cases. Here, there is
evidence of an attempt to respond to individual patient circumstances but also hints of
confused policy decisions based on incompatible goals.
Institutional Care in a Variety of Settings
Considerablelightisshedonthevarietyofinstitutionalplacementsavailablebyasurvey
of all institutional accommodation provided for Dorset cases undertaken in 1926 by Sir
Reginald Pinney, a member of the Dorset MDA Committee and a visitor of certified
institutions.
38 This document also gives an important contemporary assessment of their
relativemerits.Thereportisorganizedchronologicallyanddescribesvisitstotwenty-seven
different institutions between June and November 1926. The establishments surveyed
provided beds for 106 Dorset patients; 47 males and 59 females (Table 1). The admission
criteria of the institutions are not always clear, but it appears that Dorset sent only male
patients to five of the asylums. Female cases only were sent to thirteen units, and eight
facilities received patients of both sexes. One institution had no Dorset patients, as the
singlecasemaintainedtherehadrecently died;anotetotheeffectthatcaretherewas‘‘very
expensive’’ suggests that no future placements were contemplated.
There was, however, a variety of accommodation available, and a diversity of provision
was sought for Dorset cases. At one end of the spectrum a Miss W of Newtown appears to
have provided care for a single patient in return for domestic help. Caterham, on the other
hand, one of the huge Metropolitan Asylum Board (MAB) institutions that ringed London,
was described as a ‘‘very large establishment’’ and accommodated 13 Dorset cases.
39 The
variety of different establishments used appears to reflect both an attempt to match
individual circumstances with available provision, and an acute shortage of beds that
required extensive searches for any suitable accommodation. Pinney’s report hinted as
much, although the controversial conclusions, outlined later, that he drew from the visits
suggest it was compiled for quite a different purpose.
The report contains many interesting remarks about the institutions visited, the staff
running them, the condition of patients maintained, and the attitude of their relatives. On
the whole, Pinney found all the establishments well managed and the inmates reasonably
content. Pinney cannot be regarded as an impartial observer, but it should be remembered
37The RWCI files include no comparable
documents from any of the other partner local
authorities.
38Dorset Record Office (hereafter DorRO), A15/1/
3, Dorset County Council Mental Deficiency Act
Committee (hereafter Dorset MDA Com) minutes,
vol. 3, 1925–1928, 29 Jan. 1927, Appendix 1, pp. 8–9.
Pinney’sreportwaswrittenin1926andpresentedtothe
MDA Com in January 1927.
39Ibid, p. 8.
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Dorset cases maintained in institutions
Institution
Dorset cases late 1926 Dorset cases late 1932
Males Females Total Males Females Total
Bodvan (Carnarvon Poor Law) – 2 2 – 1 1
Brentry (colony) 1 – 1 – – 1 on
licence
Bridport Poor Law – 9 9 – 28 28
Calderstones 2 – 2 – – –
Care of farm 1 – 1 – – –
Care of Miss W – 1 1 – – –
Caterham (MAB) 7 6 13 5 2 7
Church Army Walthamstow – 3 3 – – 1 on
licence
Cirencester Poor Law 1 2 3 – – –
Darenth Colony (MAB) 3 5 8 – – –
Devon and Exeter Home of the
Good Shepherd
– 3 3 – 10 10
Fareham Poor Law 7 – 7 5 – 5
Ford House Devonport – 4 4 – – –
Fountain Mental Hospital (MAB) 1 1 2 – – –
Hildenborough farm colony 1 – 1 – – –
Leavesden (MAB) 2 2 4 1 3 4
Mount Tabor – 2 2 – 4 4
Rock Hall, Bath – 1 1 1 – 1
Royal Earlswood – 2 2 1 1 2
RWCI Starcross 6 3 9 37 22 59
Sandfield (semi-private) – – – – – –
Shepton Mallet Poor Law – 1 1 – – –
Shirley (semi-private) – 1 1 – – –
Stoke Park Colony 7 1 8 6 4 10
Stourbridge Poor Law 8 6 14 4 – 4
Tenterden Poor Law – 3 3 – 1 1
Whittington Hall, Church of
England Home
–11 –11
Awaiting institutional treatment n/a n/a n/a 10 7 17
In other institutions not used in 1926* n/a n/a n/a 14 10 24
Total 47 59 106 84 94 178
(Including on licence) (180)
* The new institutions included the Sandlebridge Colony and the St Raphael’s Colony but the
largest single group were maintained in Stapleton PLI.
Sources: figures compiled from DorRO A15/1/3, Dorset MDA Com minutes, 29 Jan. 1927,
Appendix 1, and RWCI collection, box 25, correspondence files, list of Dorset cases with ages at
1 Dec. 1932.
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Institutional Care for the Mentally Defective, 1914–1948that this was the heyday of mental deficiency institutions and the negative reputation that
they acquired after 1948 cannot be assumed to have applied in earlier periods. While
patients suffered the same loss of civil rights on being institutionalized, the more severe
criticisms that centred on overcrowding, poor staff morale leading to cases of neglect and
abuse, and decaying facilities, remain to be substantiated. Many facilities were newly
constructed at this period, even if they were designed to maximize economy rather than
comfort.
A total of 27 Dorset patients were maintained in four MAB asylums, although there was
increasing pressure from the Board of Control to return patients to the South West of
England. Darenth Training Colony accommodated a total population of 2400, but only
eight Dorset cases. The medical superintendent there seems to have had little confidence in
hisabilitytotrainthem,notingthatmostcaseswerecongenital;Pinneyunkindlysuggested
‘‘the proof of his statement being the types of parents and relations who appeared on
visitingdays’’.
40Iftrainingopportunitieswerelimited,however,thecareofferedwasoften
exemplary. Pinney noted that two severely handicapped patients were kept alive only by
‘‘skilled nurses’’ in Fountain Hospital (another MAB establishment). Research was
reported to be a priority for the medical superintendent of that institution but Pinney
describes neither its subjects nor objectives, if indeed he knew. Leavesdon (MAB) was
praised for being well managed but, while the two male patients from Dorset were thought
to be ‘‘comparatively sensible and contented’’, it was understood that nothing could
be done for the two female cases found to be ‘‘blind, deaf, immobile and helpless in
every way’’.
41
Notes accompanying later applications (from Devon as well as Dorset patients) to the
RWCI tend to suggest that most of the patients in the MAB asylums had been there a long
time; in fact most cases pre-dated the 1913 act and were not moved because there was no
other suitable accommodation. The sheer number of beds, and the level of medical atten-
tion available, was impossible to replicate in the regions and these patients were removed
only at the insistence of the Board of Control. While MAB asylums have a fairly grim
reputation in the literature, with Elaine Murphy offering a particularly detailed critique of
their regimes,
42 contemporary accounts do not present them as destinations of last resort.
Eyewitness reports from Poor Law facilities are also more complimentary than might be
assumed from Board of Control concerns about the use and misuse of such accommoda-
tion. It is, however, noticeable that Dorset used such accommodation differently to other
local authorities that have been studied. In Devon, the St Thomas Union workhouse had
longbeenusedasastagingposttovariousasylums,butthiswasstrictlyforalimitedperiod
while a bed was sought or an assessment of mental state was made. In Devon the use of
Poor Law accommodation was limited until Devon County Council took over the Axmin-
ster and Crediton workhouses as specialist mental deficiency facilities after the 1929 Local
Government Act, thereby copying Somerset’s example.
43 Although there were rumours of
more than 100 certified and uncertified cases in Devon workhouses in the early 1930s, this
40Ibid, p. 8.
41While eugenic concerns tended to focus on the
‘‘feeble-minded group’’, the care of the most severely
handicapped was often a more immediate, and
expensive, problem for local authorities.
42ElaineMurphy,‘TheLunacyCommissionersand
the East London Guardians, 1845–1867’, Med. Hist.,
2002, 46: 495–524, p. 521.
43There was some discussion about the temporary
use of Devon workhouses during the First World War
70
Graham Chester and Pamela Daleproblem was ignored by the statutory authority.
44 There was little effort to count the
number of potential patients in workhouses and no long-term plans for their accommoda-
tion were initiated. The few Poor Law cases that were actively dealt with by the statutory
authority were mostly children who had grown up in care, and some cases involving
destitution and homelessness. The situation in Dorset was quite different.
InDorsetadultcaseswereallowedtoaccumulateinavarietyofworkhousesbefore1929
and these were later re-configured as specialist facilities. Dorset cases were maintained in
eight different certified Poor Law institutions in 1926. Interestingly, by no means all of
them were local workhouses as the list included Ford House (Devonport) and facilities at
Shepton Mallet (Somerset), Cirencester (Gloucestershire), Stourbridge (Worcestershire),
Tenterden (Kent), Bodvan (Carnarvon) and Fareham (Hampshire), in addition to Bridport
(main Dorset facility). The Board of Control wanted this accommodation run down but in
Dorset there was a determination to increase it, especially for women, and a flattering
account of the different institutions appears in Pinney’s report. While Shepton Mallet (a
long-time specialist centre in Somerset) was described as only ‘‘satisfactory’’, Fareham
wasreportedtobe‘‘admirablymanaged’’,andatBodvanpatientswere‘‘strongandhealthy
and kept under kind control’’.
45 There are indications that more beds had been sought at
suchfacilitiesbuttheimpressiveStourbridgeinstitutionwith‘‘finebuildingsandgrounds’’
was reportedly oversubscribed and refusing 100 applicants per month.
46 Despite its Poor
Law origins, this institution was being developed to conform to the colony model and, as
such, provided much sought-after accommodation.
The Board of Control had strongly advocated colonies as the ideal solution to the
problem of mental deficiency and encouraged the transfer of patients to them. Pinney
duly inspected the four colonies where Dorset patients were maintained but, although he
reported that Stoke Park was ‘‘a well run Gloucestershire Institution’’, and Calderstones
but it appears that neither the County Council nor the
local Guardians were keen to develop this policy. The
Board of Control had identified Totnes workhouse as
having suitable accommodation but the Guardians
reported they had room for only their own inmates.
DRO 153/5/1/1, 22 Nov. 1917, minute 113b, and 26
Feb.1918,minute122.Torringtonworkhousehadbeen
offered to the mental deficiency committee but it was
declined because of the cost of necessary adaptations.
DRO 153/5/1/1, 29 Aug. 1917, minute 101. There was
then very little discussion about workhouse inmates
before 1929, although some parts of South Molton
workhouse were used for mental deficiency cases
between 1917 and 1939. The significant numbers of
cases later reported to be in these institutions were
possibly the responsibility of Poor Law Guardians and
later the Public Assistance Committee. In one 1935
report, 104 inmates were listed in former workhouses
appropriatedbythecouncilformentaldeficiencywork,
while a further 92 individuals were recorded in three
certified public assistance institutions, but the history
and future of this accommodation was not discussed in
any detail. Unpublished work on the Devon census for
1881 (undertaken as part of the Exminster Project) by
Joseph Melling and others suggests that at least 116
‘‘idiots’’ were accommodated in fourteen Devon
workhouses.
44DRO 153/5/1/2, A short summary of the
administration of the Mental Deficiency Acts
1913–1927 in the county, in relation to institutional
accommodation by John R Harper, chairman of the
Mental Deficiency Committee, 18 Nov. 1935, pp. 1–3.
This report listed 668 individuals under mental
deficiency orders and accommodated in various
institutions or maintained on licence or under
guardianship in Devon and elsewhere. A further 95
workhouse inmates were certified under the 1890
Lunacy Act and needed transferring to the mental
deficiency sector, and there were at least 146
individuals who were in a similar situation although
currently uncertified. There were also 224 patients
inappropriately accommodated in the mental hospital;
the medical department knew of a further 1047
individuals at large in the community and were
monitoring 361 borderline cases. This was in addition
to new referrals of ineducable children expected from
the education department.
45DorRO A15/1/3, Dorset MDA Com, minutes,
29 Jan. 1927, Appendix 1, pp. 8–9.
46Ibid, p. 9.
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Institutional Care for the Mentally Defective, 1914–1948a ‘‘magnificent new County Institution’’, this was no guarantee that Dorset could, or would
want to, access more of these beds.
47 Demand for beds was rapidly outstripping supply and
there appeared no hope of immediately increasing the number of Dorset cases from the 12
then maintained in different colonies. The lack of colony accommodation available to
Dorsetdidnot,however,leadtothecreation ofacolonyinthecounty.Whilethenumberof
Dorset cases maintained in colonies tended to increase over time, so did the number of
patients in alternative forms of accommodation (Tables 1, 2). There is little evidence to
suggest that colonies were recognized as an ideal solution for Dorset mental deficiency
cases. Instead a number of options were pursued.
Pinney himself made a series of recommendations for the MDA Committee to consider.
Hefirstnotedthathehadwrittentoinformpatients’nextofkinofhisvisitsandreportedon
their welfare. He claimed to have ‘‘received many courteous and grateful replies’’,
although, tellingly, he recommended that three of the four specific requests made to
him should be refused by the Committee. He further recommended that, ‘‘having seen
these 27 institutions, in various parts of England, and talked with many of their doctors,
it is very evident that strict segregation or sterilisation is necessary for the protection
of our race’’.
48
Detailed proposals to extend surveillance for mental deficiency cases and send all cases
found to institutions followed. Pinney recommended that once in institutions all male
patientsshouldbesterilizedandthen,ifpossible,released,whileallfemaledefectiveswere
to be sterilized or ‘‘kept in rigid segregation’’. He further argued that patients were as
content in ‘‘District Unions’’ (presumably local workhouses with a mixed population of
inmates) as they were at Royal Earlswood (the most prestigious specialist institution in
England) so long as mental defectives were kept apart from other classes of pauper. While
the Board of Control strongly advocated a medical model of care, associated with colony
provision, Pinney thought ‘‘the magnificent buildings and large staffs of doctors, nurses
and attendants are an unnecessary expense to the state’’.
49
Pinney documented Dorset’s somewhat chaotic arrangements for placing cases in a
variety of institutions in 1926. The situation was not ideal, but neither was there any
enthusiasm within the statutory authority for a wholesale revision of the arrangements.
While Pinney stressed the onerous burden of care and expense represented by the Dorset
mental deficiency cases, and came up with unacceptable plans to reduce this through
programmes of segregation and sterilization, there are other ways of reading his report.
Persons concerned for the welfare of individual patients would have been encouraged by
the attempt to match individual care requirements with the different regimes offered by the
variety of institutions available. They might also have welcomed the information that the
Dorsetpatientsinthedifferentinstitutionswerewellcaredforandgenerallycontent.While
manyoftheelitefigures,layofficialsandcouncillorsaswell asdoctors,responsibleforthe
administration of the MDAs appear to have had limited faith in the potential of people
certified as mentally defective, it was hard to move from abstract discussions about the
value of future prevention to supporting eugenic segregation, let alone sterilization in any
individual case. Instead, local cases were visited with a clear eye to their comfort and
47Ibid, pp. 8–9.
48Ibid, p. 9.
49Ibid, p. 9.
72
Graham Chester and Pamela DaleTable 2
The increase in Dorset cases institutionalized in various facilities
Institution
Dorset cases late 1932
(adapted from Table 1)
Dorset cases, revised
list April 1933
Besford Court 3 3
Bodvan (Carnarvon Poor Law) 1 1
Brentry (colony) 1
on licence
1
on licence
Bridport (former PLI) 28 28
(includes 1 on licence)
Caterham 7 7
Church Army Walthamstow 1
on licence
1
on licence
Devon and Exeter Home of the
Good Shepherd
10 10
Fareham Poor Law 5 5
Girls village home (Berkshire) 2 1
Hillside 1 1
Home of the Holy Innocents (Exeter) 2 2
Hortham Colony (Bristol) – 58
Leavesden 4 4
Mount Olivier (Frensham) 2 2
Mount Tabor 4 5
Rock Hall, Bath 1 1
Royal Earlswood 2 2
RWCI Starcross 59 60
St Raphael’s Colony 1 1
Sandlebridge 2 2
Stapleton (former PLI) 11 10
Stoke Park Colony 10 11
Stourbridge Poor Law 4 4
Tenterden Poor Law 1 1
Whittington Hall 1 1
Under Guardianship n/a 11
Awaiting institutional treatment 17 7
(described as under
section 15 orders in
PAIs)
Dorset cases in state institutions n/a 11
Total (includes those on licence) 178 (180) 248 (251)
Sources: figures compiled from DorRO A15/1/3, Dorset MDA Com minutes, 29 Jan. 1927,
Appendix 1, and RWCI collection, box 25, correspondence files, list of Dorset cases with ages at
1 Dec. 1932 and quarterly summary dated 31 Mar. 1933.
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Institutional Care for the Mentally Defective, 1914–1948welfare, andadeepsense ofpersonalresponsibility (totheindividualsconcernedaswellas
a commitment to public service) imbued the work. In Dorset certain cases were placed
under the guardianship of named officials who were expected to take a personal as well as
administrative interest in their welfare.
50
The ideological consensus that facilitated mental deficiency work was, as is evident
from Thomson’s work, extremely complex. A careful balance had to be maintained
between care, control and cost. The Dorset arrangements, described by Pinney, arguably
achieved thisin1926.Thesituationhad,however,changedby1932,andby1933therewas
a clear campaign to reduce the number of institutions used.
51 The institutional population
maintained by Dorset County Council had increased by almost 68 per cent, and this was in
line with increases elsewhere associated with the publication of the Wood Report on
Mental Deficiency in 1929.
52 Furthermore, there had been significant movements between
institutions, and between different types of institutions.
Efforts to Rationalize Institutional Care
Without significant accommodation of its own, Dorset is perhaps best understood as a
purchaser or commissioner of services, although its independence was constrained by
oversight from the Board of Control. The purchasing role created a series of relationships
with different service providers that offer insights into the problematic delivery of institu-
tionalcareundertheMentalDeficiencyActs.Crucially,the1930scontinuedtobeadecade
of a significant expansion as well as reconfiguration of services commissioned by Dorset.
More patients were institutionalized and significant numbers of inmates were transferred
(Tables 1, 2). Correspondence about these patient transfers suggests that Dorset County
Council did not usually instigate these moves. The transfers therefore provide little evi-
dence of local authority dissatisfaction with existing arrangements. Instead, they highlight
the pressure the Board of Control was exercising to bring local practices into conformity
with central government policy that stressed the importance of having a comprehensive
local mental deficiency service. It also appears that transfers were prompted by over-
subscribed institutions requesting the removal of out-of-county cases (these were often
channelledthroughtheBoardofControl),theBoardofControlcriticizingtheplacementof
individuals or groups of patients, relatives seeking to bring patients to institutions closer to
home, and occasionally funding crises. Thus, while the pattern of institutional placements
in 1933 was very different from that of 1926, this was not necessarily a sign of success for
the Dorset MDA Committee, nor was it easily achieved.
There were two major policy changes in Dorset as well as some underlying themes
affecting mental deficiency work elsewhere. Dorset, like Devon, was being encouraged to
remove patients from the MAB asylums, and, even if transfers were few, deaths gradually
reduced the number of patients maintained there. There was also a tendency not to renew
50See RWCI Collection, box 25, correspondence
files, letter from Hyde to C W Mayer 13 Apr. 1933, re
Kathleen B.
51RWCI Collection, box 25, correspondence files,
letter from J L Torr to C W Mayer, 4 Apr. 1933.
52ReportoftheMentalDeficiencyCommitteebeing
the Joint Committee of the Board of Education and the
Board of Control, 1925–29 (Wood Report), London,
HMSO, 1929. For discussion of this report and its
findings,seeThomson,op.cit.,note1above,pp.60,97,
183, 209–11, 308.
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Graham Chester and Pamela Dalecontracts with the smallest homes once existing patients (usually singletons) died or were
discharged. This development must in part have been linked to new arrangements for
guardianship. The more significant institutional changes involved the former Bridport
workhouse and the RWCI.
Bridport workhouse had long been used for mental deficiency cases and this role was
significantly expanded after the county council took over the facility. This was entirely
compatible with the Dorset strategy for mental deficiency work outlined in Pinney’s 1926
report but was viewed with suspicion by the Board of Control. In order to limit the number
and type of cases that could be maintained there, the Board of Control required that use of
the former workhouse be first approved, and then reviewed for renewal at three-yearly
intervals.
53 The Board was always keen to exclude children and ‘‘high-grade’’ cases from
Bridport and tended to increase these restrictions over time. This was despite the fact that
the unique combination of care and control such institutions were thought to offer was
valued by the local authority, and by other providers of institutional care who did not wish
to admit difficult cases.
54 In 1939 a temporary three-year extension was granted only on
condition that the institution was reserved for older ‘‘medium to low grade’’ women. Even
thislimitedapprovalwaslinkedtoDorset’sfutureuseoftheexpandedRWCI,wherephase
two was then under construction.
55
The Board of Control had long encouraged the evolving relationship between Dorset
County Council and the RWCI. However, Dorset did not view the RWCI as central to its
future plans, and took up relatively few beds at the institution compared with the local
authorities of Devon and Plymouth.
56 As a junior partner, Dorset struggled to influence the
allocationofbeds.Moreover,whenthefirstmajorpartnershipagreementwasnegotiatedin
1926, the RWCI had been clearly identified as an educational establishment and most
Dorset cases were unsuited, because of age or ability, for this type of provision.
57 Despite
53Dorset was not the only local authority to
experience problems with their workhouse
accommodation. In 1939 the Devon County Council
clerk informed the RWCI that the Board of Control
‘‘were not prepared to continue the approval of South
Molton and other Public Assistance Institutions
indefinitely’’, but suggested that removing cases the
Board of Control were particularly concerned about to
the RWCI might help. RWCI Collection, box 25,
Devon County Council correspondence, letter from
clerk to C W Mayer, 23 Mar. 1939.
54For example, correspondence between C W
Mayer and Hyde re Rose T, Jan. 1934. The RWCI
refused to treat the admission of Rose as urgent on the
groundsthat shewas alreadyinstitutionalized, but later
more disturbing information emerged and they turned
down the application despite noting that a ‘‘period of
discipline in the Bridport Institution’’ might have
improved her character. RWCI Collection, box 25,
correspondencefiles,letterfromHydetoCWMayer,2
Jan. 1934, and reply 6 Jan. 1934. See further
correspondence, J L Torr to C W Mayer, 10 Jan. 1934,
andreply,29Jan.1934.Thisreferredtoparticularssent
in Nov. 1933.
55These points were outlined in a letter from the
BoardofControltotheclerkofDorsetCountyCouncil,
later copied to the RWCI, dated 24 Apr. 1939. RWCI
Collection, box 25.
56Dorset’s initial involvement was fairly modest,
with an outline agreement to secure 50 of the planned
530 new beds. RWCI Collection, box 30, DCC
(colony), C W Mayer to J L Torr, draft agreement with
revisions,2Oct.1933,pp.1–4.Thecountyboroughsof
Exeter and Plymouth are distinct from the
administrative county of Devon. All three (plus
Somerset,Dorsetand,inalimitedway,Cornwall)were
partners of the RWCI, although Devon and Plymouth
took more beds than the others and consequently were
more involved in determining the future of the
institution.
57The RWCI admitted 2503 patients between
1 April 1914 and 31 March 1939. It is noteworthy that
2167ofthesepatientswereclassedas‘‘feeble-minded’’
and only 346 of the admissions involved adults aged
21 or older.
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Institutional Care for the Mentally Defective, 1914–1948pressure from the Board of Control and Devon County Council for a relaxation of the
admission criteria, this was a gradual process, and priority continued to be given to the
young and trainable. Dorset was left in a difficult position. In a review of cases following
the 1929 Local Government Act, Dorset needed provision for 540 ascertained cases, of
whom 188 were then maintained in certified institutions, with a further 100 cases due to be
transferred from the Poor Law authorities.
58
The partnership agreement with the RWCI was negotiated on this basis. Yet the county
council must have been concerned that Dorset provided institutional care for only six
educablechildren(mostalreadyattheRWCI),andhad152institutionalizedadultstoplace
(55 of whom were under notice of removal).
59 To compound these problems, extensions at
Starcross were delayed and interim measures had to be found. The Board of Control
appears have encouraged a new partnership with Hortham Colony, Bristol (see Table 2).
At the outset, Dorset’s involvement with Hortham seemed to follow the pattern of other
successful collaborations but soon became a serious financial liability. Dorset had already
discovered that colonies were ideal if other authorities were prepared to bear the capital
expenseof building them. Colonies builtfor largenumbers of patients tooktime to fill with
localcasesandsometimesafinanciallyembarrassedcolony-providerwaspreparedtolease
beds cheaply to Dorset. This was far more cost-effective than self-building but was not
without problems; not least the difficulty that the colonies soon filled up and new out-of-
county cases were refused. Dorset seems to have hit problems with this from time to time,
as closure to new cases was often accompanied by pressure to discharge ones admitted
earlier. During a particular crisis, Dorset signed a partnership agreement to assist with the
expansionoftheRWCI,butdelaysincompletingtheschemeencouragedanewdealwiththe
Hortham Colony. This proved ill-advised as the Hortham superintendent had a contract
allowing himtochargeDorsetforemptybedswhileoperatingvery strictadmission criteria
that excluded most patients on the council waiting list. Patients had to be moved en masse
from other, even cheaper, institutions to reduce the wasted expenditure.
60
Long-term partners, like the RWCI, were annoyed by this episode, reminding Dorset
that their low costs were due to careful economy and a policy of using the labour of ‘‘high-
grade’’ patients to subsidize the rest.
61 The RWCI was also dismayed that the Board of
Control was using competition between different institutions, and associated patient trans-
fers, to force changes to their admission criteria. In particular, patients were admitted to,
and discharged from, the state hospitals in a way that encouraged the development of
regional secure units, although the institutions themselves had not planned this.
62 The
secure units,with inevitablelong-staypopulations, upsetdevelopingrelationshipsbetween
institutional and community care: the emphasis on security detracted from the care aspects
of the work, thereby undermining public and, crucially, parental support.
63 The integrated
58RWCI Collection, box 25, correspondence files,
extract of report of [Dorset] Mental Deficiency
Committee, 20 May 1931, sent to C W Mayer with
covering letter from J L Torr, 22 May 1931.
59Ibid.
60RWCI Collection, box 25, correspondence files,
letter from Hyde to C W Mayer, 31 Jan. 1933.
61RWCI Collection, box 25, correspondence files,
letter from C W Mayer to Hyde, 2 Feb. 1933.
62See, for example, correspondence between the
Board of Control and Dorset County Council re Joyce
G,11Juneand17July1934,RWCICollection,box25.
TheBoardwantedJoycepresentedforadmissiontothe
RWCI, or alternatively Hortham, and would consider
an application to Rampton only if she proved
unmanageable in a certified institution.
63CWMayeraddressedthebenefitsofinstitutional
care and its key role in supporting community care in
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Graham Chester and Pamela Dalepenal-welfare provision outlined by commentators like David Garland was thus highly
problematic for individual institutions while being entirely compatible with overall service
development.
64
Conclusion
Evidence from the South West of England confirms that institutions were vital to the
implementation of the Mental Deficiency Acts. This conclusion tends to confirm the thesis
that they provided a distinct locus of care also supporting arrangements for extra-institu-
tional care. Yet, within this institutional provision there was greater diversity than many
commentators have allowed for. The failure fully to develop the colony solution allowed
pre-existing institutions to exert disproportionate influence over the future delivery of
services.Here itisworth notingthe contributionof the original five English voluntary idiot
institutions (including the RWCI) and the MAB asylums. At the same time, the limited
supply of specialist beds required local authorities to turn to other providers of institutional
care. Thus the Poor Law, and its gradual fragmentation, was intimately connected with the
development of mental deficiency services although the full implications of this, institu-
tionalandotherwise,havenotbeenfullyexploredtodate.Theprovisionofworkhousecare
under the MDAs has been neglected as a research topic, although the ideological con-
nections between workhouses, prisons and different types of asylums inspired Garland’s
workandledtoaverypessimisticassessment ofmentaldeficiencywork.
65Inthisrespectit
is interesting to note that Pinney found least optimism amongst medical staff at the largest
MAB asylums.
If anything, the diversity of institutional provision serving the South West of England
suggests a continuum of care and control options. Literature that presents community care
as more benign than the institutional sector does, however, miss the point that the twowere
intimately connected. In presenting community care as an alternative to institutional care
there is also a tendency to use a static model of both. This paper has found evidence of
significant developments in both sectors and an evolving relationship between the two.
Thisisnottoimplyaccruedbenefitstoserviceusersbutshouldbetakenintoaccountinany
assessment of care either sought or offered.
The ongoing involvement of a variety of statutory and voluntary sector organizations in
mental deficiency work in the South West of England highlights the importance of the
mixed economy of care; with cooperation and competition both in evidence. These find-
ings lend support to the work of Thomson, Jackson, Wright, Digby and Bartlett,
66 but also
suggest the value of case studies that foreground the provision of institutional care after
1914. Three distinct models for the provision of institutional care are suggested. While
these were clearly not the only options available, there are indications that variations on
these arrangements were common to many English local authorities, with the definite
his speech to the annual meeting of the Dorset
Voluntary Association, 30 Mar. 1936, although his
scripted remarks make no reference to the ongoing
negotiations with Dorset County Council. RWCI
Collection, box 31.
64Garland, op. cit., note 3 above.
65Ibid., pp. 241–2.
66See references in note 1 above.
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Institutional Care for the Mentally Defective, 1914–1948exception of those accessing the MAB system. The model of care and control pioneered in
Somerset was probably the most successful, in the sense that it met stated local aspirations
while achieving conformity with Board of Control requirements, although this assessment
should be tempered by the acknowledged shortfall in available accommodation and the
financial and organizational constraints that explained this. In Somerset it does appear that
the mix of institutional and community-based services which the statutory authority could
and did utilize provided opportunities for a phased expansion of services. This reduced the
severity of the short-term crises that often paralysed long-term planning in Devon and
Dorset.
In Somerset the coordination of effort betweenthe statutory and voluntary sectors seems
tohave beenparticularly important. InDevon andDorset there were closepersonal linksas
well as organizational ties between the two sectors, although crucially no dominant figure
equivalent to Mrs Cooke-Hurle of Somerset emerges from the records of either county.
67
We are also able to confirm the importance of the mixed economy of care, and suggest that
the range of services identified were viewed differently by the various actors involved, and
their opinions were subject to revision over time. It has not been possible to detail the
response of service-users and their families, although this remains a goal for future
research. It is, however, noteworthy that most of the filed RWCI correspondence relates
to active requests for institutional care; from prospective patients, parents and others.
We do not wish to offer an overly optimistic assessment of institutional care for the
mentally defective. The loss of liberty was unacceptable to some contemporary as well as
most modern commentators, while the care provided was often limited, and regard for
personal circumstances was frequently subordinated to the management of a large and
heterogeneous population of ‘‘defectives’’. Yet the care provided was less homogenous
thansomecriticalaccountssuggestandthisdiversityallowedforcompetinginterpretations
of what represented the best model of care. Over time it seems that the diversity of
institutional care available came to be regarded as a welcome resource for ‘‘purchasers’’
of care, because it allowed individuals to be placed in institutions that best met their
personal needs. However, mental deficiency campaigners continued to bemoan the lack of
policy coherence that had allowed the situation to arise. It is certainly the case that the
many and varied institutions in use across the South West of England in the 1930s could be
presented as a comprehensive mental deficiency service, but it was not the one envisaged
by supporters of the original campaign for the 1913 Mental Deficiency Act.
67The closest equivalent is Lt-Col F B Nixon who
servedasChairmanoftheDorsetMDACommitteeand
acted as the Dorset representative on the Joint
Committee of the RWCI, but he was far less prominent
in decision makingat the RWCIand hisrole withother
voluntary organizations is unclear. Also in Dorset,
Miss Castleman-Smith provided a link between the
local voluntary association and the statutory
committee, while in Devon several members of the
statutory committee served for many years on the
RWCI management committee.
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